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Abstract 
What does it cost a non-profit community organization to run a “high-touch” program for 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs)? This paper presents final unit-cost estimates 
(updating Schreiner 2002a and 2000a) for the Community Action Project of Tulsa County. A 
participant-month of IDA services had program costs of about $61 (excluding matches). With 
net monthly IDA savings of about $20 per participant, $1 saved in an IDA cost about $3. 
Benefits were not measured, so it is not known whether they exceed costs. In any case, 
knowledge of costs helps inform IDA policy. While not precluding complementary “high-
touch”, targeted, time-limited, community-based IDA programs with state, local, or private 
funding to provide financial education and other supports, it seems likely that an inclusive, 
permanent IDA program would require a high-tech, “low-touch” basic design run by low-cost 
asset managers with federal funding. 
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Program Costs for Individual Development Accounts: 
Final Figures from CAPTC in Tulsa 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Policymakers and analysts are coming to realize that saving and asset 
accumulation drive development and long-term improvement in well-being (Schreiner 
and Sherraden, forthcoming; Sherraden, forthcoming; Schreiner et al., 2001; Shapiro and 
Wolff, 2001; Ackerman and Alstott, 1999; Conley, 1999; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995; 
Friedman, 1988; Haveman, 1988). For the middle and upper classes, a variety of public 
policies already subsidize saving and asset accumulation through education, home 
ownership, and retirement savings (Howard, 1997; Sherraden, 1991). 
The poor, of course, could use similar help. While saving is not easy for anyone, 
it is even more difficult for the poor because they start with fewer resources and because 
the policy mechanisms that subsidize saving tend to work through tax breaks or to 
require existing wealth. 
 Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are a new policy proposal designed to 
address these constraints and to include the poor in institutions that promote saving 
and asset accumulation. IDAs provide matches for savings used for home purchase, 
post-secondary education, or microenterprise. (Some programs also match retirement 
savings, job training, home repair, or the purchase of cars or computers.) IDA 
participants also receive financial education and counseling from program staff. 
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 IDAs have attracted broad political support. Bill Clinton supported IDAs in his 
1992 campaign and later proposed a large matched-savings program (Wayne, 1999). In 
2000, both George W. Bush and Al Gore had IDA proposals in their platforms (Bush, 
2000; Kessler, 2000). About 34 states have IDA legislation (Edwards and Mason, 2003), 
and the Assets for Independence Act authorized $250 million for IDAs in 1999–2009. 
Furthermore, the Savings for Working Families Act—if passed—would provide $450 
million for 300,000 IDAs over 10 years. Outside the United States, Taiwan has an IDA-
like demonstration, and Canada has sponsored a randomized IDA experiment. In the 
United Kingdom, the Savings Gateway resembles IDAs (Kempson, McKay, and 
Collard, 2003), and the new Child Trust Fund will give each newborn an account and a 
deposit, with larger deposits for children in poor families (H.M. Treasury, 2003). 
 IDAs provide benefits to participants. But what do IDAs cost society? This 
paper looks at program costs in a “high-touch” IDA program run out of a non-profit 
community organization, the Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC). 
 Social cost is the value of resources used up in the production of IDAs. Schreiner 
(2002a and 2000a) describes the concepts of cost measurement and documents “start-
up” and “on-going” costs at CAPTC from October 1998 through June 2001. (Sherraden, 
2000, comments on this exercise.) The present paper summarizes costs through the end 
of the program in December 2003. 
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 From start to end, CAPTC’s IDA program produced the following accumulated 
outputs (Figure 1, lines d–f): 
• 471 participants 
• 15,213 participant-months 
• $301,645 of net IDA savings 
 Excluding matches of $377,947 (line j), accumulated program costs were 
estimated at $922,473 (line i). Thus, costs per unit of output were (lines n–p): 
• $1,959 per participant 
• $61 per participant-month 
• $3.06 per $1 of net IDA savings 
Annual costs per participant-month were highest at “start-up” in 1998–9 ($86, 
line l). As the up-front costs of recruitment and financial education were diluted over a 
growing participant base, unit costs decreased in 2000–1 to $56 and $41. In 2002–3, 
however, unit costs increased to $55 and then $94, as participants left the program, 
either after having made a matched withdrawal (a little less than half of participants) 
or without having made a matched withdrawal. 
After the first two years, accumulated costs per participant-month were constant 
at about $60 (line o). For comparison, very rough self-reported cost estimates for 14 
IDA programs in the American Dream Demonstration were about $70 per participant-
month (Schreiner et al., 2001). 
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Annual net IDA savings decreased at a greater rate than annual costs (net 
additions to IDA savings were barely positive in 2002–3, due to unmatched 
withdrawals), so the costs per dollar of net IDA savings increased over 2001–3. For this 
IDA design at CAPTC, once start-up costs were diluted, time did not reduce unit costs. 
 The average match rate at CAPTC was about 1.5:1. Thus, matched withdrawals 
turned each $1 of net savings into $2.50 of asset accumulation ($1 of savings plus $1.50 
in matches). Social cost per $1 of asset accumulation was about $1.82, found as 
[$922,473 + ($301,645 x 1.5)] / [$301,645 x (1+1.5)]. 
 Are costs “high” or “low”? The answer ultimately depends on the benefits 
produced by IDAs. Unfortunately, these are still unmeasured. Furthermore, IDAs are 
still young, and the possible efficiency of service provision is still unknown. 
How do IDAs stack up against other financial- and human-capital programs? Ng 
(2001) finds that IDAs cost more per participant than 401(k) plans, perhaps because 
current IDA programs have fewer participants to dilute fixed costs. Costs for IDAs are 
in the same range as some human-capital programs (such as Women, Infants, and 
Children) but are much lower than for other programs (such as Head Start). 
 Of course, the costs of IDAs depend on program design and in particular on the 
extent of program services. Furthermore, although the cost estimates here were made 
with great care, some values cannot be known with certainty and so, like all such 
exercises, the estimates rest on a host of imprecise measurements, heroic assumptions, 
and back-of-the-envelope guesses. The margin of error is unknown, and the summary 
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measures of output ignore many aspects of the bundle of services that is an IDA. 
Finally, these financial-cost estimates do not consider benefits. 
 Even without knowledge of benefits, rough measures of costs can still be useful. 
First, they provide a benchmark for improving future estimates. Second, once benefits 
are estimated, unit costs are key inputs for financial benefit-cost analysis. Third, 
rigorous measurement of costs provides a healthy balance to anecdotes about the 
benefits of IDAs. Wise policy choices must consider not only benefits but also costs 
(Schreiner and Yaron, 2001; Devarajan, Squire, and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997). Fourth, 
cost estimates set a performance benchmark; all else constant, the same output for less 
cost is better. Fifth, the very existence of measures of cost tends to produce healthy 
pressures for efficiency (Schreiner, 2003). 
 The cost estimates in the two predecessors of this paper sparked lively debate in 
the IDA field and contributed to a growing desire to develop and test IDA designs 
whose cost structures would allow making IDAs available to all people at all times. 
Such a permanent and universal IDA policy would—of necessity—be federally funded 
and be run by a center asset manager rather than from “high-touch” non-profits. Of 
course, states, localities, and private donors could still fund the targeted, time-limited, 
community-based “high-touch” programs that have been the norm so far, perhaps to 
complement the basic policy structure with financial education and other supports. 
It is tempting to cut costs by hacking off services from the IDA bundle. The real 
challenge, however, is to determine which IDA services matter the most and then to 
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find efficient ways to provide them. Improvement requires innovation, and innovation 
requires incentives. Knowledge of costs tends to create incentives to innovate by 
frustrating contentment with the status quo. 
 
 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes IDAs, 
CAPTC, and outputs for IDAs at CAPTC. The section after that presents estimates of 
costs. The final section discusses unit costs along with caveats and implications. 
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2. IDAs, CAPTC, and outputs 
 
This section describes IDAs, the design of CAPTC’s IDA program, the 
characteristics of participants, and some basic measures of output. 
2.1 Individual Development Accounts 
IDAs are subsidized savings accounts. Unlike other subsidized savings accounts 
such as Individual Retirement Accounts or 401(k) plans, IDAs are targeted to the poor, 
provide subsidies through matches rather than through tax breaks, and require 
participants to attend financial education. IDA savings are matched if used to buy 
assets that improve long-term well-being, usually home purchase, post-secondary 
education, and microenterprise. In principle, accounts can be opened at birth and can 
remain open for a lifetime. Match funds may come from public or private sources, and 
there are no restrictions on unmatched withdrawals (except the loss of the match). 
Thus, IDAs are a flexible policy tool that almost anyone—the government, employers, 
or development organizations—can plug into. Sherraden (1991 and 1988) proposed 
IDAs as an example of asset-based development. 
To date, most IDA programs have been run out of community non-profits with a 
mix of public and private funds. Because of funding constraints, the time frame for 
making deposits and matched withdrawals has usually been limited to 2–5 years. 
Accounts are kept with regulated, insured banks and credit unions. Most programs 
require financial-education classes and provide social support and financial counseling. 
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2.2 IDAs at CAPTC 
The Community Action Project of Tulsa County is a comprehensive, non-profit 
community anti-poverty agency whose mission is to help people in economic need to 
achieve self-sufficiency. As part of the American Dream Demonstration, CAPTC ran 
one of the first and largest IDA programs. This program featured a social experiment in 
which qualified applicants were randomly assigned to either a “treatment” group with 
access to IDAs or a “control” group without access to IDAs. Data was collected from 
both groups for 4 years, and future work will estimate the benefits of IDAs by 
comparing outcomes between the two groups. The program started in October 1998, 
enrolled its first participant in January 1999, and ended in December 2003. 
On the whole, IDA participants at CAPTC were poor. To qualify, they had to 
show past-month pay stubs and past-year tax returns to prove that they were working 
and that their income was less than 150 percent of poverty. (Applicants also had to 
agree to participate in the experiment, even if assigned to the control group.) At 
enrollment, income for the 471 participants averaged 115 percent of poverty. About 45 
percent had received income-tested public assistance (Figure 2), and 43 percent had 
received non-IDA social services from CAPTC or from a partner organization. 
 On average, participants were disadvantaged in terms of race/ethnicity, gender, 
and marital status. About 46 percent were Caucasian, and 43 percent were African 
American (Figure 2). In terms of gender, 77 percent were female. About 76 percent of 
participants were not married, and 51 percent were single mothers. 
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In terms of education, employment, and bank-account ownership, participants 
were relatively advantaged (Figure 3). Ninety-two percent were working or in school, 
and 72 percent had attended some college (29 percent had a degree). Before opening the 
IDA, 87 percent owned a passbook savings account and/or a checking account. 
 Matchable uses of IDAs at CAPTC included home purchase, post-secondary 
education, microenterprise, home repair, and retirement savings. The match rate was 
2:1 for home purchase and 1:1 for other uses. At enrollment, 65 percent of participants 
planned to buy a house (Figure 4). The second-most common plan (13 percent) was 
“rolling over” the IDA plus match into a Roth IRA for retirement savings. 
 After opening an IDA, participants could deposit up to $750 per year for 3 years. 
Thus, maximum matchable savings was $2,250, and maximum asset accumulation 
(savings plus match) was $4,500 ($6,750 for home buyers). About 13 percent of 
participants saved the maximum amount, while 52 percent had net IDA savings of less 
than $100. Matched withdrawals were possible from 6–42 months after enrollment. 
Among participants with a matched withdrawal as of October 31, 2003, 42 percent did 
home repair, 21 percent retirement savings, 19 percent home purchase, 12 percent post-
secondary education, and 6 percent microenterprise (Figure 4). 
 The average participant had net (matchable) IDA savings of $640, corresponding 
to asset accumulation (if matched at the average rate of 1.5:1) of $1,600. Participants 
made deposits in 7 of 12 months and saved 1.9 percent of their income in IDAs. 
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 CAPTC required 12 hours of general financial education, 4 of them prior to 
opening an IDA. Asset-specific education was also required before matched 
withdrawals: 5 hours for home purchase, 2 hours of post-secondary education, 16 hours 
for microenterprise start-up, and 2 hours for retirement savings. 
 The IDAs themselves were passbook accounts in the participant’s name in the 
Bank of Oklahoma. Participants could make unmatched withdrawals at any time. 
(CAPTC kept match funds apart, disbursing matches directly to vendors.) The bank 
paid interest on IDA balances and waived minimum-balance requirements as well as its 
standard fees for low-balance passbook accounts. The bank mailed quarterly statements 
to participants, and CAPTC mailed monthly statements that showed not only the IDA 
balance but also the corresponding match. If a participant went a month without 
making a deposit, CAPTC staff made “prodding” phone calls.  
 For this IDA design and these participants at CAPTC, Figure 1 (lines a–c) 
shows three measures of output: enrollments, participant-months, and net IDA savings. 
  An enrollment is when an applicant completes the requirements to participate 
and opens an IDA. There were 471 enrollments: 261 in 1999, 208 in 2000, and 2 in 2001. 
 A participant-month is a calendar month in which an IDA is open. For example, 
enrolling in January 1999 and closing the IDA in June 2000 implies 18 participant-
months. The number of participant-months at CAPTC was 1,583 in 1999, peaked at 
5,091 in 2000, and then decreased over 2001–3 from 4,435 to 3,020 to 1,084. 
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 Net IDA savings are matchable dollars in an IDA or already-matched dollars 
from an IDA. That is, net IDA savings have been matched or could be matched. Net 
additions to net IDA savings were $52,061 in 1999, peaked at $145,910 in 2000, and 
decreased to $97,443 in 2001. In 2002–3, additions to net IDA savings were barely 
positive ($28,934 in 2002 and –$22,704 in 2003), due both to unmatched withdrawals as 
the program wound down and to the fall-off in the number of participants eligible to 
make matchable deposits in this period. All told, the average participant had net IDA 
savings of $640, or about $20 per participant-month. The next section presents 
estimates of the cost of producing these outputs. 
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3. Cost estimates 
 
This section discusses some the challenges of the cost-measurement exercise and 
then presents the cost estimates. 
3.1 Cost measurement at CAPTC 
In broad terms, the cost exercise identified resources that were used up and then 
valued those resources. CAPTC accountants and IDA staff identified and valued cash 
expenses. Staff also identified in-kind and in-time donations, and the donors valued 
their contributions in financial terms. This is all straightforward (albeit subject to some 
judgment in valuation). The main challenges were to look at costs from an appropriate 
point of view and to make the cost estimates representative of a typical “high-touch” 
IDA program run by a community-based non-profit. 
3.1.1 Social costs 
 The overall evaluation of the American Dream Demonstration—of which this 
financial-cost analysis is but one part—considers the points of view of seven groups of 
stakeholders: IDA participants, non-participants, the federal government, state and 
local government, the employees of IDA programs, private donors, and society as a 
whole (Schreiner, 2000b). For an evaluation, the most important point of view is that of 
society as a whole. The narrower points of view matter only inasmuch as all 
stakeholders—if they are to do their part—must receive benefits that exceed their costs. 
 Some stakeholders may not care about social costs (Sherraden, 2000). For 
example, if IDA participants’ benefits exceed their costs, then they may not mind if 
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IDAs are a net drag on overall social development. Likewise, if IDAs have no fiscal cost, 
then the government may not mind if IDA programs divert private donations away 
from, say, food pantries or homeless shelters. 
 The role of the evaluator, however, is to take the point of view of society, 
because no one else will (Schreiner, 2003). IDA participants can be trusted to do their 
own benefit-cost analysis and to participate only as long as their expected benefits 
exceed their expected costs. Likewise, the government can look out for itself. But for a 
social decision such as IDA policy, an evaluator must check whether net benefits for 
some groups are enough to compensate for net costs for other groups. 
 While this cost exercise focuses on costs to society, specific groups can derive 
narrower measures from Figures 5–7. The focus on social costs has several implications. 
For example, matches are a wash for society, as costs to donors are exactly offset by 
benefits to participants. Also, contributions from private donors are counted as part of 
social cost, although what share is counted as diverted from other “good causes” is still 
a judgment call. 
3.1.2 Representativeness 
 Estimates derived from cash and non-cash costs identified and valued by 
CAPTC and donors are good approximations of the true costs of IDAs at CAPTC; they 
have high “internal validity” (Orr, 1999). CAPTC’s IDA program, however, was not a 
typical “high-touch” program run by a community-based non-profit. Thus, its low 
“external validity” could limit the relevance of the cost estimates for other programs. 
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 For example, CAPTC was atypical in that it provided matches for retirement 
savings. Also, because CAPTC ran an earlier IDA program, the “younger sister” 
examined here did not have to start from scratch (decreasing costs) but faced a diluted 
pool of applicants (increasing costs). Furthermore, the program had many more 
participants (471) than most current IDA programs. Because CAPTC was one of the 
first and largest IDA programs, its staff were often called on to present at conferences, 
provide informal technical assistance to newer programs, and to support state and 
federal policy work. As pioneers, they could learn only from their own mistakes. 
Most importantly, the program’s experimental design—an atypical feature 
existing solely for purposes of evaluation—increased costs. Recruitment costs were at 
least twice as high, as only half of qualified applicants were assigned to the treatment 
group. The prospect of being assigned to the control group deterred some unknown 
number of potential applicants, further increasing recruitment costs. Explaining the 
experiment one-on-one to potential applicants also required a lot of staff time. Staff also 
had to collaborate with researchers during the design phase, and later they had to 
respond to requests for evaluation data. Finally, CAPTC knew the importance of the 
experiment for future IDA policy, and it responded by providing a very “high-touch” 
design. For example, staff called treatment-group members who had not opened an IDA 
to press them to do so. Staff also mailed monthly deposit-reminder cards to all 
participants, and they made phone calls to check up on participants who went a month 
without making a deposit. Because staff wanted the experiment to show that IDAs 
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work, they went the extra mile to help participants save successfully. Of course, this led 
to atypically high costs as well as atypically high outputs. 
These factors have an ambiguous effect on unit costs relative to a “typical” 
program. To improve “external validity” and relevance, this exercise has attempted to 
measure costs as they would have been, had the CAPTC IDA program been typical. In 
particular, extraordinary recruitment costs were removed, along with most other costs 
obviously due to the experimental evaluation. Costs due to pioneering policy work and 
associated with the extraordinarily “high-touch” service, however, could not be removed. 
Further details are available on request and in Schreiner (2002a and 2000a). 
No cost estimate is exact. The estimates here—while admittedly coarse—are 
accurate to an order of magnitude and are, in any case, far better than the (often 
implicit) assumption that costs are zero. In the end, what matters is not that estimates 
are perfect and incontrovertible—they never can be—but rather that the measurements, 
assumptions, and judgments that support them are explicit and therefore subject to 
critique and improvement (Schreiner, Ng, and Sherraden, 2003; Schreiner, 2002b). 
3.2 Assumptions 
The cost estimates below use several simplifying assumptions. First, the time 
value of money was ignored. This is mostly harmless, as the time frame was short, 
inflation was low, and most costs and outputs took place in the first few years. Second, 
unused funds were assumed to be returned to their donors. Third, donor’s transaction 
costs in providing funds (and CAPTC’s costs in securing funds) were assumed nil. 
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Fourth, the opportunity cost of participants’ time in financial-education classes and in 
other IDA-related activities was ignored. Fifth, the opportunity cost to participants of 
saving—tying up resources in passbook accounts, rather than consuming them or 
investing them elsewhere—was ignored. Sixth, all donations—whether from public or 
private sources and whether in-cash, in-kind, or in-time—were assumed to be shifted 
from some other socially valuable use and thus to carry opportunity costs. 
3.3 Cost estimates 
This section presents estimates of cash and non-cash costs by source. 
 Private entities that bore costs for CAPTC’s IDA program (Figure 5) included 
the Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED, which handled funds from the 
private foundations who funded the American Dream Demonstration); the Bank of 
Oklahoma (BOk) and its philanthropic arm, the Kaiser Foundation; the Zarrow 
Foundation; CAPTC itself; individual VISTA volunteers; the IDA program’s volunteer 
advisory board; and other private individuals and businesses. Overall, these private 
sources bore costs of almost exactly $300,000, 57 percent of it in cash. Most non-cash 
costs were for recruitment advertising and for waived account fees. 
 The federal government bore costs (Figure 6) through Community Service Block 
Grants (CSBG), Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), the Affordable 
Housing Program (AHP) of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, the Fannie Mae 
Foundation, the VISTA program, and public-service advertisements. The federal  
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government covered costs of about $612,000 (94 percent of it in cash), mostly for 
operating expenses through CSBG and CDBG. 
 State and local governments contributed $11,000 toward non-cash costs (Figure 
7) through a few classes taught by the Oklahoma State Extension Service, some help 
with applicant in-take by the Tulsa Department of Urban Development, and some 
grant reporting by the Tulsa Housing Authority. 
 Overall, costs were about $922,000 (excluding the $387,000 in matches). The 
federal government covered about two-thirds of these costs, private entities covered one-
third, and state and local governments covered 1 percent. About 81 percent were cash 
costs, and 19 percent were non-cash costs. 
About three-fourths of cash costs were for staff salaries, rent, and overhead at 
CAPTC. This reflects not only CAPTC’s “high-touch” approach but also that IDA 
programs produce social services and so most costs are for labor. The largest class of 
non-cash costs was waived bank-account fees ($5 per participant-month). 
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4. Unit costs and discussion 
 
This section uses the outputs and costs just presented to estimate costs per unit 
of output. It concludes with a discussion of caveats and of implications for IDA policy. 
4.1 Unit costs 
From 1998 to 2003, output produced by CAPTC’s IDA program could be seen as 
471 participants, 15,213 participant-months, and/or $301,645 of net IDA savings 
(Figure 1, lines d–f). Excluding $377,947 in matches (line j), cumulative operating costs 
(line i) were $922,473. The estimates of unit costs are then (lines n–p): 
• $1,959 per participant 
• $61 per participant-month 
• $3.06 per $1 of net IDA savings 
Costs per participant rose through time, but this is natural because costs 
continued to accumulate even after all participants had enrolled. Costs per participant-
month fell in the first three years of the program but then rose in the last three years, 
and costs per dollar of net IDA savings followed the same pattern. This may suggest 
that there are economies of size in IDA programs, as costs were lowest in the years with 
the most participant-months. Or it may suggest that costs were concentrated at the 
start in recruitment and then at the end of the program as staff managed matched 
withdrawals. 
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 The average match rate at CAPTC was 1.5:1. Each $1.00 of net IDA savings 
produced $2.50 of asset accumulation. For each $2.50 of asset accumulation, there were 
$3.06 of operational costs and $1.50 of matches. Thus, when counting matches, each 
dollar of asset accumulation had a cost of about $1.80. 
4.2 Discussion 
What do these estimates of unit costs mean for IDA policy? While it is easier to 
measure costs than to make policy choices, policy choices are easier with cost measures 
in hand. The discussion below considers caveats to the exercise, possible political risks 
of cost measurement, how IDAs differ from traditional cash assistance, and some final 
speculations on the future of IDA policy. 
4.2.1 Caveats to cost estimates 
 The cost exercise took care to count all costs (and only those costs) typical in the 
current incarnation of IDA programs. Like any such exercise, it mistakenly includes 
some costs and omits others. The direction of bias, however, is unclear, so the estimates 
could be too high or too low. While the exact margin of error is unknown, eliminating 
all bias probably would not change the orders of magnitude. It appears that in their 
current form as “high-touch”, targeted, time-limited programs run from community-
based non-profits, IDAs are costly. 
Some specific caveats are noted here. First, this exercise looks at only a single 
IDA program, so the results may be purely idiosyncratic and thus void of general 
lessons. Second, costs are likely to fall with time, both for a given IDA program and for 
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the IDA field as a whole, as programs learn what works, as programs grow and reap 
economies of size, and as IDA infrastructure develops. In general, IDAs aim for 
development of the highest sort—to improve people’s ability to do and to be what they 
have reason to want—and such development takes time and is often indirect and 
diffuse. In this sense, many costs have already been incurred, and most of the benefits 
are yet to come. Third, it was not possible to completely remove the costs incurred due 
to CAPTC’s pioneering policy work and its extraordinary level of “high-touch” service. 
Likewise, some one-time “start-up” costs that would not have been incurred by a 
“typical” IDA program may not have been excluded. Fourth, it is unusual to count the 
opportunity cost of the time of volunteers. Many cost studies do not count non-cash 
costs at all. Fifth, the transaction costs for funders and CAPTC in providing and 
securing funds were ignored, as were all transaction costs for participants. Sixth, the 
costs of IDAs should be compared with the costs of alternatives. But cost estimates for 
alternatives usually do not exist, and even when they do, comparisons still hinge on 
subjective judgments, as few other things are held constant (Ng, 2001). 
Perhaps the key caveat is that costs are best considered in the context of 
benefits. Unfortunately, estimates of benefits are not yet available. Even when they are, 
the value of many benefits—such as increased home ownership or greater involvement 
in children’s education—will be difficult to monetize. In the end, policy makers must 
compare apples with oranges, but knowing their costs improves the chances of making 
wise choices. 
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4.2.2 Risks of cost measurement 
In political terms, cost estimates may handicap IDAs vis-à-vis alternatives for 
whom costs have not been measured. Pritchett (2002) argues that, for policy purposes, 
“it pays to be ignorant”; when costs are left unmeasured, advocates (or opponents) can 
safely make whatever claims they find convenient. The same principle holds for 
measuring benefits. For example, Orr (1999, p. 257) quotes Rossi (1987) as saying that 
“when evaluated, the expected value of the effect of a social program is zero”. 
A related issue is that it is easier to quantify costs—at least the costs of service 
provision—than to quantify benefits. Thus, costs may seem more “real” and thus carry 
disproportionate weight in debates. Thus, while not measuring costs can be a stratagem 
to perpetuate inefficient services that benefit favored groups, measuring costs can also 
be misused to replace high-cost (but high-benefit) services with low-cost (but low-
benefit) services (Tolley and Rowland, 1995). 
If the emperor’s clothes look expensive, the proper response is not to avert the 
eyes but rather to describe costs and benefits as well as possible, to explain how to use 
the information, and to hope that explicitness, measurement, and the society-wide point 
of view wins out over implicitness, anecdotes, and special-interest groups. The on-going 
evaluation of IDAs has tried to take the high ground. If, in the policy arena, bad 
arguments drive out good arguments, then evaluation serves only to add a pseudo-
scientific veneer to points that advocates (or opponents) already think they know. 
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4.2.3 IDAs and traditional cash assistance 
To accumulate $50 in assets in a month through IDAs at CAPTC, participants 
saved $20, funders provided $30 in matches, and CAPTC incurred $60 of operating 
costs. Would it be better just to send people who would have participated a monthly 
check for $90 or so? For several reasons, asset accumulation through IDAs is not 
directly comparable with traditional cash assistance for immediate consumption. 
Most fundamentally, IDAs were never meant to substitute for traditional cash 
assistance (Sherraden, 1991). Hungry people cannot and should not save. Instead, IDAs 
were meant to provide access to a positive development policy in the gap between very 
poor people who need relief and middle- and upper-class people who benefit from 
existing asset-development policies. In this sense, IDAs differ from traditional cash 
assistance in several ways. 
 First, IDAs require participants to save. Thus, IDAs are self-targeted to those 
people who are willing and able to sacrifice today for a better tomorrow. Cash transfers 
do not have this same type of targeting. 
 Second, IDAs put time between making deposits and receiving matches, and this 
time may prompt participants to “savor their savings” and to think about how best to 
use their expected asset accumulation. IDA participants may think about their 
resources in ways that the recipients of cash transfers do not, and this may lead to 
non-economic changes in patterns of thought and behavior (Schreiner et al., 2001). 
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 Third, IDAs attempt to restrict matches to the purchase of assets that generally 
improve long-term individual and social well-being. In fact, it might be said that IDAs 
attempt to transfer not cash but rather homes, human capital, and microenterprises. 
 Fourth, IDAs are coupled with financial education that attempts to transfer 
knowledge and world views conducive to long-term wealth and well-being. 
 Fifth and finally, counseling and encouragement from IDA staff may boost 
saving (Moore et al., 2001). 
 In short, IDAs are more than just matched savings accounts; they are a bundle 
of services and institutional structures designed to make it easier for the poor to save 
and build assets. In a way, they seek not only to create savings but also savers 
(Sherraden, 2000). Thus, IDAs are not directly comparable with cash transfers. 
4.2.4 Costs and the future of IDA policy 
Over 4 years, this cost exercise has encouraged the IDA field to step back and 
take stock: If these unit-cost estimates are in the ballpark, what should be done? In 
broad terms, the responses have involved: 
• Identifying benefits beyond saving and asset accumulation: 
o Benefits from financial education and counseling 
o Benefits through time 
o Benefits to household members and even to local communities 
• Improving the quality of IDA services (e.g., financial education) to increase benefits 
• Finding innovative ways to reduce costs 
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The experiment at CAPTC intends to improve knowledge of benefits, but its 
results are not yet in. In the meantime, the focus is on improving service quality and/or 
reducing costs. This has two parts, promoting innovation and getting staff to work 
longer and/or harder. Assuming that staff members already do their best, the only 
option left is to innovate, doing more with less by doing things differently. 
 Unfortunately, innovation does not happen by decree. IDA programs must have 
a reason to invest effort and to take risks to try something new. For businesses, the 
reason is competition. Often for non-profits, the reason is crisis. In this sense, cost 
estimates help create healthy pressure for innovation. 
 Qualitative research at CAPTC suggests that participants place a high value on 
the “high-touch” approach (Sherraden et al., 2003). At the same time, such labor-
intensive services are costly. Thus, a key challenge is to identify which services matter 
most and then to find ways to provide them efficiently. 
Unlike traditional cash assistance (a check in the mail to enable greater 
consumption), IDAs are a bundle of services, constraints, and opportunities meant to 
help poor people to save and build assets. The bundle includes access not only to 
matches and a structured institutional saving environment but also to financial 
education, staff support, and financial counseling. For some participants, access to a 
fee-free passbook account may draw them into the formal financial system, and having 
a bank account—even with just a $500 balance—can have large financial and 
psychological effects (Caskey, 2002). For others, classes on budgeting, investment, and 
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debt can expose them to new ways to come up with resources to save. For still others, 
the match makes it worthwhile to expend the extreme effort required to save from their 
meager resources. Because IDAs are bundles, it is difficult to know which—if any—
elements could be trimmed. Thus, there is room for innovation to discover how each 
part of the bundle works and how they all work together. 
Even if the unit-cost estimates in this paper have marked upward biases, and 
even if unprecedented cost-saving innovations are developed, the “high-touch” IDA 
design will remain costly. Sherraden (2000, p. 7) writes, “With experience and 
efficiencies, this figure ($3 per $1 of net IDA savings) might eventually be reduced to $2 
or even $1 for each dollar of savings. However, it is most unlikely that costs for 
intensive, community-based IDA programs can be reduced to, say, 10 cents for each 
dollar of net savings.” Even if benefits do turn out to exceed these costs, funders—and 
in particular, the federal government, the only entity with deep enough pockets to 
support a permanent, universal IDA policy—might have difficulty supporting IDAs with 
the current bundle of services and decentralized structure. Sherraden (2000, p. 8) writes 
that “it seems likely that if IDAs . . . are someday to reach millions or tens of millions 
of people, (they) will operate as a large, simple, minimum-cost system. This system of 
progressive savings accounts would likely be defined in federal law with public 
financing, and operated from mutual-fund or other financial-service companies.” 
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The tension between intensive services and the types of cost structures that can 
reach millions of people may lead to two tiers of IDA designs (Sherraden, 2000). The 
first tier would be run by centralized asset managers and would feature broad, 
permanent access, simple services, sustainable federal funding, and lower costs. This 
“bare-bones” design would reach more participants with lower costs per participant, but 
it would also have lower benefits per participant per year. It might plug into existing 
529 College Savings Accounts (Clancy, Orszag, and Sherraden, 2004). If low costs make 
the “bare-bones” design more sustainable through time than the “high-touch” design, 
then it may increase long-term benefits per participant (Schreiner, 2002c). 
The second tier would be run from community-based non-profits and would 
resemble the current “high-touch” design at CAPTC. It would feature targeted, time-
limited, intensive services, and it would be supported by short-term funding from state, 
local, or private sources. This “high-touch” design would reach fewer participants and 
have higher costs per participant. It would also have higher benefits per participant per 
year, and it would reach poorer people. The “high-touch” design could complement the 
“bare-bones” design by providing financial education and other supports. As Sherraden 
(2000) points out, such a two-tier asset-building policy has a precedent in the promotion 
of low-income home ownership. 
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Figure 2: Demographic characteristics of IDA 
participants at CAPTC 
Characteristic Percentage 
Receipt of income-test public assistance 
No 55 
Yes 45 
  
Receipt of non-IDA social services from CAPTC or partner 
No 57 
Yes 43 
  
Race/ethnicity  
Caucasian 46 
African American 43 
Native American 6 
Hispanic 2 
Other 2 
Asian American 1 
  
Gender  
Male 23 
Female 77 
  
Marital status  
Married 24 
Never-married 42 
Divorced or separated 31 
Widowed 3 
  
Single motherhood  
No 49 
Yes 51 
Source: Data from CAPTC and calculations of the author. 
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Figure 3: Employment status, education status, and 
bank-account ownership for IDA participants at 
CAPTC 
Characteristic Percentage 
Employment status  
Full-time 65 
Part-time 18 
Student 9 
Unemployed 7 
Not working 1 
  
Education status  
Did not complete high school 9 
Completed high school or GED 19 
Attended college 43 
2-year college degree 15 
4-year college degree or more 14 
  
Bank-account ownership  
Passbook only 13 
Checkbook only 29 
Both passbook and checkbook 46 
Neither passbook nor checkbook 13 
Source: Data from CAPTC and calculations of the author. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of planned and actual uses of 
matched withdrawals among IDA participants at 
CAPTC 
Use of matched withdrawal Planned (%) Actual (%) 
Home purchase 65 19 
Retirement savings 13 21 
Home repair 11 42 
Post-secondary education 7 12 
Microenterprise 5 6 
Source: Data from CAPTC and calculations of the author. 
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